Knowledge discovery for adaptive negotiation agents in e-marketplaces by Lau, Raymond et al.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
QUT Digital Repository:  
http://eprints.qut.edu.au/ 
 
This is the post-print, accepted version of this article. Published as: 
 
Lau, Raymond Y.K. and Li, Yuefeng and Song, Dawei and Kwok, Ron Chi Wai 
(2008) Knowledge discovery for adaptive negotiation agents in e-marketplaces. 
Decision Support Systems, 45(2). pp. 310-323. 
           
© Copyright 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. 
Knowledge Discovery for Adaptive
Negotiation Agents in e-Marketplaces
Raymond Y.K. Lau ∗
Department of Information Systems
City University of Hong Kong
Tat Chee Avenue, Kowloon
Hong Kong SAR
Yuefeng Li
School of Software Engineering and Data Communications
Queensland University of Technology
GPO Box 2434, Brisbane, QLD 4001, Australia
Dawei Song
Knowledge Media Institute, The Open University
Walton Hall, Milton Keynes, MK7 6AA
United Kingdom
Ron Chi-Wai Kwok
Department of Information Systems
City University of Hong Kong
Tat Chee Avenue, Kowloon, Hong Kong SAR
Abstract
With the increasing popularity of e-marketplaces for B2C and B2B e-commerce,
intelligent software agents are promising in improving the effectiveness of these mar-
kets by autonomously searching for products and negotiating contracts on behalf of
the human decision makers. A large number of research has been conducted to de-
velop negotiation protocols and mechanisms for automated negotiations. However,
existing negotiation systems are weak in dealing with incomplete and dynamic nego-
tiation spaces which are common for negotiations in e-commerce. This paper illus-
trates a novel knowledge discovery method and a probabilistic negotiation decision
making mechanism to improve the performance of negotiation agents participating
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in e-marketplaces. Our preliminary experiments show that the probabilistic negoti-
ation agents empowered by knowledge discovery mechanisms are more effective and
efficient than the Pareto optimal negotiation agents in simulated e-marketplaces.
Key words: Knowledge Discovery, Bayesian Learning, Adaptive Negotiation
Agents, e-Marketplaces.
1 Introduction
The number of transactions conducted over e-marketplaces has grown rapidly
in recent years. In the context of Business-to-Business (B2B) e-commerce, e-
marketplaces are no longer operated in isolation but function as a series of
interacting markets along an electronic supply chain (eChain) [33]. Software
agents are encapsulated computer systems situated in some environments such
as the Internet and are capable of flexible, autonomous actions in that envi-
ronment to meet their design objectives [36]. It is argued that software agents
can provide high level of intelligence and autonomy for the discovery of busi-
ness partners and facilitating transactions [33]. These agents can incorporate
experiential knowledge of past transactions to streamline the effects of volatile
demand and supply conditions across multiple e-marketplaces in the electronic
supply chain. Negotiation refers to the process by which group of agents (hu-
man or software) communicate with one another in order to reach a mutually
acceptable agreement on resource allocation (distribution) [21]. This paper fo-
cuses on the development of a novel knowledge discovery method to enhance
negotiation agents’ decision making processes in B2B e-marketplaces.
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1.1 The Problems
In typical B2B negotiation situations, a negotiator does not know the prefer-
ences of its opponents because each party wants to protect their own business
interests. Nevertheless, knowing the preferences of the opponents (e.g., the
reservation prices) may help improve the efficiency of the negotiation pro-
cesses since negotiation agents (human or software) can avoid wasting their
time to explore the non-fruitful negotiation options. For cooperative agents,
having partial knowledge about their opponents may even help improve the
negotiation effectiveness because it becomes easier for the agents to identify
the “win-win” outcomes from among the set of feasible solutions. Unfortu-
nately, classical negotiation models [5,32,35,37] do not address the learning
issue essential for real-world negotiations. Instead, these models often assume
that the preferences (e.g., the utility functions) of the opponents are available
as public information. Such an assumption turns out to be invalid for typi-
cal e-commerce negotiation situations. Even though agent-based negotiation
systems have been developed, these systems still suffer from the problems of
supporting only limited types of negotiation scenarios (e.g., bi-lateral nego-
tiations, price only negotiations, availability of opponents’ payoff functions,
or static negotiation spaces) [6,10,22,31]. One of the ways to alleviate the
weakness of classical negotiation models and provide adequate support for
real-world negotiations is to empower negotiation agents with a knowledge
discovery mechanism so that they can continuously “mine” the preferences of
the opponents based on the histories of negotiation dialogs among the partic-
ipating agents.
1.2 Contributions
This paper illustrates the design and development of adaptive negotiation
agents to enhance the degree of autonomy and the efficiency of e-marketplaces.
In particular, the common weaknesses of existing negotiation systems are ad-
dressed by introducing a novel knowledge discovery method and a Bayesian
learning mechanism to improve the learning autonomy and adaptation power
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of negotiation agents. These adaptive probabilistic negotiation agents can dis-
cover crucial negotiation knowledge such as the opponents’ changing prefer-
ences by mining the past negotiation histories and continuously monitoring
the current negotiation dialogs with their opponents. Our preliminary experi-
ments show that the probabilistic negotiation agents empowered by our novel
knowledge discovery mechanism outperform a negotiation mechanism which
guarantees Pareto optimum. Our research work opens the door to the develop-
ment of practical intelligent systems to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency
of modern e-marketplaces.
1.3 Outline of the paper
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. A comparative study
of previous research work is reported in Section 2. The system architecture
of the adaptive agent mediated e-marketplace is outlined in Section 3. An
introduction to the basic negotiation mechanism which guarantees Pareto op-
timum is given in Section 4. Section 5 illustrates the computational details
of the probabilistic negotiation decision making mechanism and the associ-
ated knowledge discovery method for adaptive negotiation agents. Section 6
describes the quantitative evaluation of the adaptive negotiation agents em-
powered by the proposed knowledge discovery method and the probabilistic
decision making mechanism. Finally, we offer concluding remarks and describe
future direction of our research work.
2 Related Work
Fuzzy logic has been applied to develop intelligent negotiation agents in e-
Marketplace [6]. Nine pre-defined fuzzy rules are used to generate trade-off
for quantitative issues and another nine fuzzy rules are used to generate con-
cession for qualitative issues separately [6]. The proposed negotiation model
is somewhat limited since it is developed from the perspective of the supplier
agents only. The main weakness of the fuzzy negotiation system is that it is
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not adaptive; for instance, the system cannot learn and refine the pre-defined
fuzzy rules automatically. The probabilistic negotiation agents proposed in
this paper are adaptive since they are empowered by a knowledge discovery
mechanism to continuously mine the the preference information of their op-
ponents.
Non-linear regression has been applied to estimate the specific parameters
(e.g., lower/upper bounds of the zone of acceptance of an attribute, negoti-
ation deadline, weight of individual tactic, etc.) of the time-dependent and
the behavior-dependent negotiation tactics [4]. It is assumed that agents’
negotiation tactics are static and therefore it is possible to estimate these
parameters based on the current negotiation dialogs. According to the eval-
uation in asymmetric bi-lateral negotiation situations, the regression-based
agent decision making model can achieve utility gains. Instead of estimating
the specific parameters of some pre-defined negotiation tactics, our proposed
method adopts a non-parametric negotiation knowledge discovery approach
where the opponents’ negotiation tactics are not assumed static and treated
as public information. Our probabilistic negotiation agents are evaluated in a
multi-lateral dynamic negotiation scenarios.
Naive Bayesian classification has been applied to develop negotiation agents
in the context of multi-agent co-ordination [5]. Negotiation is treated as a
refinement process (a hill-climbing search) based on an agreement tree. Each
agent employs a refinement bias function (i.e., a utility function) to narrow
their search. The refinement function is expressed as: Uagroup(o) = Ua(o) +∑
b∈{A−a} Ub(o), where Uagroup(o) is an agent a’s perception of the joint payoff
of a group of agents A for an offer o, and Ua(o) is agent a’s own utility function.∑
b∈{A−a} Ub(o) represents agent a’s belief about the total payoff generated for
its opponents. An agent can learn others’ payoff functions by employing the
naive Bayesian classifier Pr(ci|o) = Pr(ci)
∏
j
Pr(ej |ci)
Pr(o)
, where ci represents the
discretized utility value (i.e., a class) and ej is one of the features of an offer
o. In other words, given an offer o, the probability of an agent b ∈ {A − a}
obtaining a payoff ci is estimated based on the prior probabilities Pr(ej|ci) and
Pr(ci). Nevertheless, one main problem of this approach is the assumption that
the opponent will disclose its preference information (e.g., the prior probability
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Pr(ej|ci)) so that an agent can construct the training examples. Our approach
estimates the probability of an offer being accepted by the opponent (i.e.,
Pr(accept|o)) based on the offer exchange information stored in a negotiation
history file.
Zeng and Sycara [37] have developed a sequential negotiation model called
Bazaar. It was believed that an agent’s belief about the opponent’s true
reservation price could be computed according to the posterior probability
Pr(Hi|o) = Pr(Hi)Pr(o|Hi)∑n
k=1
Pr(o|Hk)Pr(Hk) , where Pr(Hi) characterizes the probability
distribution of the opponent’s reservation prices and was assumed public in-
formation in the negotiation system. Moreover, domain knowledge in the form
of conditional probabilities Pr(o|Hi) describing the chance of receiving an of-
fering price o given the opponent’s true reservation price Hi was assumed
available. This approach suffers from the problem of assuming the availability
of the opponents’ private information (e.g., the true reservation price). We il-
lustrates an efficient data mining method of deriving the priori probabilities of
offer acceptance without the assumption of the availability of the opponents’
private information. Moreover, our proposed Bayesian learning mechanism is
extended to deal with multiple negotiation issues.
Mining customers’ transaction files to discover their shopping preferences has
been conducted [16]. In particular, a Bayesian Belief network (BBN) is con-
structed to capture the dependency among the preferred shopping items based
on the mutual information derived from among these items. The recommender
system generates a recommendation set by referring to the customer’s cur-
rent transactional actions and the trained BBN representing the shopping
preferences of a particular customer. Our work is similar in the sense that
we mine the negotiators’ negotiation histories to discover their corresponding
preferences. However, we use a computationally more efficient naive Bayesian
approach since we would like the negotiation agents to conduct automated ne-
gotiations in real-time. As indicated in their paper [16], the learning process
of the Bayesian network model is relatively complicated and computational
expensive. Our approach seems more suitable for a practical implementation
of negotiation agents for real-time transaction negotiations.
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As a summary, there are variety of approaches of negotiation knowledge dis-
covery such as case-based reasoning [3], fuzzy rules [6], time series approxi-
mation [24], Bayesian learning [5,37], Markov Chain Process [25], evolution-
ary learning [19], etc. Generally speaking, these learning approaches can be
classified into the broad categories of parametric [3,19,24] or non-parametric
methods [5,25,37]. The negotiation knowledge discovery method illustrated in
this paper is based on non-parametric approach since heterogeneous negotia-
tion agents utilizing various tactics may be deployed to e-Marketplaces. Our
non-parametric negotiation learning method is unique in the sense that it can
support multi-party multi-issue negotiation situations and it has been tested
under dynamic negotiation environment.
3 System Architecture
The system architecture of the Web services and intelligent agents based e-
marketplace (AMEM) is depicted in Figure 1. Although the architecture of
a service-oriented e-marketplace has been proposed before [7,18], our system
architecture is enhanced by intelligent agents, and it is based on a sound B2B
business model, namely the Business-to-Business Transaction model (BBT) [15].
The typical activities conducted in the e-marketplace are described as follows:
(1) With reference to Step 1 depicted in Figure 1, a buyer can make use of
her agent (a client program) to search for the UDDI service directory [34]
to locate the publicly available e-marketplace;
(2) Similarly, a seller can also utilize her agent to locate suitable e-marketplace
for selling products (depicted as Step 2 in Figure 1);
(3) After identifying the preferred e-marketplace, the buyer or the seller can
deploy her negotiation agent to the e-marketplace through a registration
process. In particular, the negotiation agent will be authenticated by the
facilitator agent based on its digital certificate (Step 3 in Figure 1);
(4) After successful registration, a negotiation agent can retrieve relevant
market information (e.g., what kind of products are sold by which agents
and the reputation of these agents) from the facilitator agent (Step 4 in
Figure 1);
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Fig. 1. Agents Mediated e-Marketplace (AMEM)
(5) Once a negotiation agent identifies the appropriate business partners, it
can start to communicate with them directly (Step 5 in Figure 1). At this
stage, the negotiation agent can make use of its negotiation history with a
particular partner to “mine” the preference of that partner. If a negotia-
tion history does not exist (e.g., the partner is new to the e-marketplace),
the negotiation agent starts by making offers immediately. After a few
rounds of negotiations, the negotiation agent can utilize its negotiation
knowledge discovery mechanism to estimate the opponents’ preferences
based on the recent encounters. The details of our naive Bayesian learn-
ing based negotiation knowledge discovery mechanism will be illustrated
in Section 5;
(6) After the negotiation process, a negotiation agent can inform the facil-
itator agent if its partners could really stick to their agreements. Such
a feedback is useful for the facilitator agent to compose the reputation
information of individual negotiation agents. For subsequent trading, a
negotiation agent can save its negotiation time by choosing the busi-
ness partners with good reputation. As a result, the throughput of the
e-marketplace is bootstrapped.
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Fig. 2. A Client Interface for the Buyer Agent
When a negotiation agent is deployed to the e-marketplace, the human ne-
gotiator needs to specify her preference and other negotiation parameters.
According to Figure 2, the buyer states that the weight of the “Quantity”
negotiation issue (i.e., an attribute) is 0.2 and there are three options (i.e., at-
tribute values) of this negotiation issue, namely 1−10 items, 11−50 items, and
100 − 500 items. The valuation of these negotiation options are 0.7, 0.4, and
0.1 respectively. The details of the multi-attribute utility theory (MAUT) [17]
based preference representation model will be described in Section 4. At the
bottom of Figure 2, the human negotiator can specify some negotiation pa-
rameter such as the number of agent-enabled negotiation rounds before the
control is passed back to the human negotiator. The “Register” button allows
the human negotiator to deploy the negotiation agent to the e-marketplace and
register the negotiation agent via the facilitator agent of the e-marketplace. As
the e-marketplace supports a variety of negotiation methods, the human ne-
gotiator can choose the particular negotiation method from the “Negotiation
Methods” field (bottom left in Figure 2).
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4 A Pareto Optimal Negotiation Model
A sequential alternate-offering negotiation protocol, a variant of the mono-
tonic concession protocol [29], is adopted in the simulated e-marketplaces.
Automated negotiation proceeds in a discrete series of rounds. In each round,
each negotiation agent makes an offer in alternate. If these offers overlap, it
means that an agreement is reached. If the offers do not overlap, negotiation
proceeds to the next round where the agents make a concession. If there is no
agreement after the deadline is reached, the negotiation process is terminated
with a conflict. The Pareto optimal negotiation mechanism illustrated in this
section is based on multi-attribute utility theory [17].
A negotiation spaceNeg = 〈P,A,D, U, T 〉 is a 5-tuple which consists of a finite
set of negotiation parties (agents) P , a set of attributes (i.e., negotiation issues)
A understood by all the parties p ∈ P , a set of attribute domains D for A, and
a set of utility functions U with each function U op ∈ U for an agent p ∈ P . An
attribute domain is denoted Dai where Dai ∈ D and ai ∈ A. A utility function
pertaining to an agent p is defined by: U op : Da1 × Da2 × . . . × Dan 7→ [0, 1].
Each agent p has a deadline tdp ∈ T . It is assumed that information about
P,A,D is provided by the facilitator agents in an e-marketplace. A multi-
lateral negotiation situation can be modeled as many one-to-one bi-lateral
negotiations where a negotiation agent p maintains a separate negotiation
dialog with each opponent. In a negotiation round, the agent will make an
offer to each of its opponents in turn, and concentrate on the most favourable
counter-offer from among the set of incoming offers evaluated according to its
own payoff function U op .
An offer −→o = 〈da1 , da2 , . . . , dan〉 is a n-tuple of attribute values (intervals)
pertaining to a finite set of attributes A = {a1, a2, . . . , an}. An offer can also
be viewed as a vector of attribute values in a geometric negotiation space
with each dimension representing a negotiation issue. Each attribute ai takes
its value from the corresponding domain Dai . Generally speaking, a finite
set of candidate offers Op acceptable to an agent p (i.e., satisfying its hard
constraints) is constructed via the Cartesian product Da1 ×Da2 × · · · ×Dan .
As human agents tend to specify their preferences in terms of a range of values,
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a more general representation of an offer is a tuple of attribute value intervals
such as oi = 〈20 − 30, 1 − 2, 10 − 30, 100 − 500〉 for a1 := “price” measured
in terms of $, a2 := “warranty period” measured in terms of years, a3 :=
“shipment time” measured in terms of days, and a4 := “quantity” measured
in terms of number of units.
Preference representation is concerned about rating a set of potential offers
according to an agent’s specific negotiation interests. The valuations of indi-
vidual attributes and attribute values (intervals) are defined by the valuation
functions UAp : A 7→ [0, 1] and UDaip : Dai 7→ [0, 1] respectively, whereas UAp
is an agent p’s valuation function for each attribute ai ∈ A, and UDaip is an
agent p’s valuation function for each attribute value dai ∈ Dai . In addition, the
valuations of attributes are assumed normalized, that is,
∑
ai∈A U
A
p (ai) = 1.
One common way to quantify an agent’s preference (i.e., the utility func-
tion U op ) for an offer o is by a linear aggregation of the valuations [2,13,26]:
U op (o) =
∑
ai∈A,dai∈o U
A
p (ai)×UDaip (dai), where dai is the attribute value interval
specified in an offer o.
If an agent’s initial proposal is rejected by its opponent, it needs to propose an
alternative offer with the least utility decrement (i.e., computing a concession).
An agent will maintain a set O
′
p which contains the offers it has proposed
before (including the offer proposed in the current round). In a negotiation
round, an alternative offer with a concession can be determined based on
∃ocounter∈{Op−O′p} ∀ox∈{Op−O′p} : [ox p ocounter], where ox p oy denotes that an
offer oy is more preferable than another offer ox. The alternative offer ocounter is
the most preferable offer from among the set of feasible offers which have not
been proposed before. The preference relation p is a total ordering induced
by an agent p’s utility function U op over the set of feasible offers Op. In other
words, the feasible offers of an agent p are ranked in descending order of utility
driven by (p, Op). The concession mechanism works by picking an offer from
the top of the list ranked by (p, {Op −O′p}) in each negotiation round.
When an incoming offer o is received from the opponent, an agent p first
evaluates if o ∈ Op is true (i.e., the offer satisfying all its hard constraints).
To carry out such a task, an equivalent offer o' should be computed. o'
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represents agent p’s interpretation about the opponent’s proposal o. Once o'
is computed, acceptance of the incoming offer o can be determined with respect
to p’s own preference (p, Op). An offer o' ∈ Op is equivalent to o iff every
attribute interval of o' intersects each corresponding attribute interval of o.
Formally, any two attribute intervals dx, dy intersect if the intersection of the
corresponding sets of points is not empty (i.e., dx ∩ dy 6= ∅). The acceptance
criteria for an incoming offer o (i.e., the equivalent o') is defined by:
(1) If ∀ox∈Op ox p o', an agent p should accept o since it produces the
maximal payoff.
(2) If o' ∈ O′p is true, an agent p should accept o because o' is one of
proposals it makes before.
It is shown that if each participating agent p ∈ P employs their preference
ordering (p, Op) to compute concessions and uses the offer acceptability cri-
teria described above to evaluate incoming offers, Pareto optimal [29] result
is always found if it does exist in a negotiation space [2].
5 The Probabilistic Negotiation Agents
The development of the probabilistic negotiation mechanism for adaptive ne-
gotiation agents is driven by the basic intuition that rational negotiators strive
for two possibly contradictory objectives [10,19]: (1) maximizing self payoffs,
and (2) maximizing the chance of reaching an agreement. The former can be
computed according to a negotiator’s private utility function as discussed in
Section 4, and the latter can be estimated based on Bayesian learning [8]. The
proposed adaptive negotiation agents can refer to the negotiation history files
to discover the negotiation preferences of their opponents. Moreover, these
agents can monitor the current negotiation dialog with their opponents to
identify the possible preferential changes of their opponents.
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5.1 Probabilistic Negotiation Decision Making
Our probabilistic negotiation agents’ decision making mechanisms are under-
pinned by a ranking function; this function produces a ranked list of offers
according to the potential of individual offers for maximizing self payoff and
the chance of offer acceptance by the opponent. In particular, the preference
relation p of a probabilistic negotiation agent is a total ordering induced
by the product of the agent’s private utility function U op and the probability
function Pr(accept|o) which characterizes the probability of acceptance of an
offer o by the opponent. In other words, the feasible offers of an agent p are
ranked in descending order according to:
Rank(o) = [U op (o)]
α × [Pr(accept|o)](1−α) (1)
where α ∈ [0, 1] is a trade-off factor for maximizing one’s own payoff or maxi-
mizing the chance of the offer being accepted by the opponent. If α = 0 is set,
a negotiation agent only considers maximizing the opponent’s payoff, that is
a strictly benevolent agent. On the other hand, if α = 1 is true, a negotiation
agent only considers maximizing its own payoff, that is a strictly self-interest
agent. The initial value of the trade-off factor α is provided by the human
user. Moreover, a system wide default of 0.5 will be assumed if the α value is
not provided initially. It should be noted that the absolute numerical value of
Rank(o) is not important, but the relative rank of an offer o.
A counter-offer with the least amount of concession (in terms of the least
decrement of own payoff and the minimal reduction of offer acceptability) is
selected from the top of the list (p, {Op−O′p}) ranked by an agent p in each
negotiation round. Once the counter-offer is determined, it will be added to
the set O
′
p. The revised O
′
p forms the basis to evaluate the incoming offers. The
probability of acceptance of an offer o can be computed according to Bayes
theorem [8]:
Pr(cj|o) = Pr(o|cj)× Pr(cj)
Pr(o)
(2)
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where cj ∈ {accept, reject} and j is the index of a particular class. If the naive
assumption of feature (i.e., negotiation issue) independency is made, the prior
probability Pr(o|cj) can be approximated by:
Pr(o|cj) =
|A|∏
i=1
Pr(dai|cj) (3)
where dai is one of the attribute values of an offer o. By the addition rule
of probability theory, Pr(o) =
∑n
j=1 Pr(o|cj) × Pr(cj) is held. Therefore, the
probability of acceptance of an offer o by the opponent can be estimated
according to:
Pr(accept|o) = (Pr(accept)×∏|A|i=1 Pr(dai|accept))÷
[Pr(accept)×∏|A|i=1 Pr(dai|accept)+
Pr(reject)×∏|A|i=1 Pr(dai|reject)]
(4)
It should be noted that if only a partial counter-offer (i.e., some attributes are
missing in an offer) is evaluated, the corresponding terms such as Pr(dai|accept)
and Pr(dai|reject) are treated as 1 because these negotiation issues are consid-
ered not relevant by an agent. As a result, the probability of offer acceptance is
determined by other attribute values. Currently, there are two operating modes
of our probabilistic negotiation agents, namely adaptive and non-adaptive. For
the non-adaptive mode, the probability negotiation agents estimate the oppo-
nents’ preferences based on the past negotiation histories only. They operate
based on the negotiation mechanism described in Section 4 except that the
offer ranking is established according to Eq.(1) instead of based on an agent’s
own utility function. After a negotiation session begins, the preferences of an
agent and its opponents are assumed unchanged.
On the other hand, for the adaptive probabilistic agents, the probability func-
tion Pr(accept|o) is revised in each negotiation round based on the most recent
negotiation dialog. Therefore, the adaptive probabilistic negotiation agents
are sensitive to the opponents’ recent preferential changes. After updating the
priori probabilities based on the current negotiation dialog, the set of feasible
offers Op for the agent p ∈ P will be re-ranked again according to Eq.( 1).
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As a result, more sensible negotiation decision making can be conducted from
time to time according to the most recent preferences of agent p and its op-
ponents. As the time dimension is always an important issue for practical
negotiations [21], our probabilistic negotiation agents are extended to take
into account the time pressure:
Rank(o) = [U op (o)]
α×TP (t) × [Pr(accept|o)](1−α×TP (t)) (5)
The term TP (t) represents the time pressure function. The basic intuition is
that when the negotiation deadline is approaching, an agent is more likely to
concede in order to make a deal [14,30]. However, different agents may have
different attitudes towards deadlines. An agent may be eager to reach a deal
and so it will concede quickly (Conceder agent). On the other hand, an agent
may not give ground easily during negotiation (Boulware agent) [28]. There-
fore, a time pressure function TP (t) = 1− ( t
tdp
)
1
ep is developed to approximate
a wide spectrum of agents’ concession attitude. Our TP function is similar
to the negotiation decision function referred to in the literature [9,11]. The
term tdp indicates the deadline for an agent p, and ep is used to model the
“concession attitude” of the agent p. An agent p will demonstrate Boulware
behavior if the concession attitude 0 < ep < 1 is set. On the other hand, an
agent will exhibit Conceder behavior if the concession attitude ep > 1 is spec-
ified. If ep = 1 is defined, the agent holds Neutral attitude towards concession.
When the negotiation deadline is approaching, the value of α decreases and
so is the weight of maximizing one’s own payoff. When this time adjustment
mechanism is enabled, the agents will re-rank their remaining feasible offers
at the beginning of each negotiation round.
5.2 Mining Negotiation Knowledge
Data mining refers to the non-trivial process of identifying valid, novel, po-
tentially useful, and ultimately understandable patterns in data [12]. In the
context of knowledge discovery for automated negotiations, the novel patterns
are the negotiation preferences (i.e., the frequently requested issues and their
values). This kind of patterns is ultimately understandable and potentially
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useful because they can be applied to improve both negotiation effectiveness
(e.g., joint payoffs) and negotiation efficiency (e.g., reducing the amount of
time to reach agreements). In association rule mining, the measures of rule
support and rule confidence are used to evaluate the quality of the associa-
tion rules extracted from frequent item-sets [1]. In fact, rule support and rule
confidence correspond to the joint probability and the conditional probabil-
ity of the appearance of items (e.g., consumer products) in transactions. Our
approach of discovering the preferences of negotiators is also based on com-
puting the priori probabilities of the frequently requested items (negotiation
options) appearing in some offers. The prior probabilities such as Pr(accept),
Pr(reject), Pr(dai|accept), and Pr(dai|reject) can be estimated based on the
negotiation histories. Figure 3 depicts a segment of a negotiation history file.
Fig. 3. A Segment of Negotiation History
The basic assumption of our negotiation knwoledge discovery method is that
each counter-offer from the opponent is considered an acceptable offer (i.e.,
a positive training example). Moreover, if an agent proposes an offer and it
is rejected by the opponent, it is treated as a negative training example. As
agents’ preferences may change in real-world negotiation situations, the most
recent negotiation session archived is more useful than the sessions archived
long time ago in terms of estimating the opponent’s current preferences. More-
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over, a negotiation agent will maintain a separate history for the negotiation
processes it conducted with each of its partners. A negotiation session refers
to a particular negotiation process. The negotiation process ends when an
agreement could be reached or all the parties decide to quit. For each nego-
tiation process (session), a negotiation agent will make series of offers (i.e.,
entries). Based on the above assumptions, the training examples generated
from the past negotiation sessions and the current negotiation dialog should
be weighted. The weight factor wSi is computed and assigned to a negotiation
session i according to a linear function:
wSi = wmax − step×
wmax − wmin
|session| − 1 (6)
where wSi is the highest weight assigned to a particular negotiation session i;
the terms wmax > 0 and wmin > 0 represent the maximal and the minimal
weights assigned to valuate all the negotiation sessions. The term |session| is
the total number of archived negotiation sessions including the current negotia-
tion session for knowledge discovery purpose. The term step = 〈0, 1, . . . , |session|−
1〉 represents the sequence of negotiation sessions. For example, the step value
of the most current negotiation session is 0, and the second most current
session is 1, so on so forth.
In addition, the weight of each offer (or counter-offer) within a negotiation
session i varies. For instance, a counter-offer proposed by the opponent at the
earlier stage is more preferable (for the opponent) than the one proposed at a
later stage. Therefore, each entry in a negotiation session i is also weighted in
chronological order. The second weight factor wEij for the jth negotiation entry
(i.e., an event) in the ith archived negotiation session is computed according
to:
wEij = w
S
i − (j − 1)×
wSi − wSi+1
|E| (7)
where E is the total number of entries of an archived negotiation session i.
wSi and w
S
i+1 are the highest session weights assigned to the i session and
the session immediately preceding it respectively. For the oldest session (i.e.,
(i+ 1) > |session|) in a negotiation history file, the value of wSi+1 is assumed
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zero.
Session Offers Price Shipment QTY Opponent Weights
(da1) Time (da2) (da3) Accept (cj)
4 o1 5− 10 1− 2 20− 30 N 200
o2 15− 20 3− 4 50− 50 Y 175
o3 1− 2 2− 2 10− 20 N 150
o4 25− 30 5− 8 60− 100 Y 125
3 o1 5− 10 1− 2 20− 30 N 300
o2 15− 20 3− 4 50− 50 Y 275
o3 1− 2 2− 2 10− 20 N 250
o4 25− 30 5− 8 60− 100 Y 225
2 o1 5− 10 1− 2 20− 30 N 400
o2 15− 20 3− 4 50− 50 Y 375
o3 1− 2 2− 2 10− 20 N 350
o4 25− 30 5− 8 60− 100 Y 325
1 o1 5− 10 1− 2 20− 30 N 500
Table 1
A Weighted Sample Space
Table 1 shows an example of the sample space which consists of 3 past
negotiation sessions and 1 current negotiation session. The maximal weight
wmax = 500 and the minimal weight wmin = 200 are set. The entry depicted
at the bottom of Table 1 represents the current negotiation session between
an agent and its opponent. The weight of the second most current negotiation
session is computed according to Eq.(6), that is wS2 = 500−1× 500−2004−1 = 400.
In addition, the weight of the second negotiation entry in this session is com-
puted according to Eq.(7), that is wE22 = 400 − (2 − 1) × 400−3004 = 375. In
fact, the weights can be interpreted as the additional sample points attached
to each event (i.e., a training example). According to Table 1, there are 3650
sample points in the sample space, and Pr(accept) = 1500
3650
= 0.41 is estimated.
Similarly, Pr(reject) = 2150
3650
= 0.59, Pr(price=25-30|accept) = 675
1500
= 0.45,
Pr(qty=50-50|accept) = 825
1500
= 0.55.
One common difficulty of applying the naive Bayesian learning approach to
solve real-world problems is how to deal with zero conditional probabilities
for some features (also called the smoothing problem) [23]. We adopt one
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of the common methods to estimate the priori conditional probability if an
event does not appear in our training set [27]: Pr(dai|cj) = Pr(cj)N , where the
attribute value dai does not co-occur with the decision value cj in the train-
ing set. The term N is the total number of sample points of the training
sample space. Basically, zero conditional probability is replaced by a small
constant. For example, the conditional probability Pr(price=25-30|reject) =
Pr(reject)
N
= 0.59
3650
= 0.00016 is derived. If a particular attribute interval doai of an
offer o is evaluated, it may intersect with more than one attribute interval dhai
recorded in the training set. For example, if (price=20-30) is one of features
of an offer, it intersects with the features (price=15-20) and (price=25-30)
found from the training set. For the optimistic negotiation agents, the highest
Pr(dai|accept) and the lowest Pr(dai|reject) are selected. On the other hand,
for the pessimistic negotiation agents, the lowest Pr(dai|accept) and the high-
est Pr(dai|reject) are used. Whether an agent is optimistic or not is controlled
by the parameter Opt when it is first instantiated. For instance, if Opt = 1 is
set, the agent will be instantiated as an optimistic agent.
6 The Experiments
6.1 General Procedure
The simulated e-marketplaces were characterized by multi-lateral negotiations
among some buyer agents (B1, . . . , Bn) and some seller agents (S1, . . . , Sn).
These agents negotiated over some virtual services or products described by
five attributes (i.e., |A| = 5) with each attribute domain containing five dis-
crete values Dai = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}. For each agent p, the size of the feasible offer
set is: |Op| = 55 = 3, 125. The valuation of an attribute or a discrete attribute
value fell in the unit interval of (0, 1]. For each negotiation case, an agreement
zone always existed since the difference between the buyers and the sellers
only lay on their valuations against the same set of negotiation issues (e.g.,
attributes and attribute values). The simulated e-marketplaces were symmet-
ric where the same number of buyers and sellers participated.
19
As described in Section 4, the alternate offering protocol was adopted in our
simulated e-marketplaces. At the beginning of every negotiation round, each
agent would invoke its own decision making mechanism to generate an of-
fer for that round. The order of deliberation of out-going offers among the
agents was randomly chosen by the facilitator agent. At the message exchange
phase, each agent sent the offer messages to all the opponents (e.g., S1→ B1,
S1 → B2, S1 → B3, etc. for the seller S1). After the message exchange
phase, the facilitator agent randomly selected a sequence of agents such as
〈B2, B1, S1, S2, . . . , Sn〉 for incoming offer evaluation. For instance, with ref-
erence to the above sequence, agent B2 would evaluate its incoming offers
first, then agent B1 would evaluate its incoming offers, etc.. If agreements
could be made, an agent always selected the best deal (evaluated according to
its private utility function). If there was a tie, an opponent would be randomly
selected by an agent. Once an agreement was made between a pair, they would
be removed from the e-marketplace immediately by the facilitator agent, and
the remaining agents would continue their negotiations until either agreements
were made or the negotiation deadline was due. Our e-marketplaces were in-
stantiated on a PC with a Pentium-4 2.2GHz single processor and 1 GB main
memory. To avoid the communication overheads, all the experiments were con-
ducted under our Intranet environment. All the agents were developed using
Java SDK 1.5.0.
6.2 Evaluation Measures
Both the effectiveness (in terms of average joint payoff) and the efficiency (in
terms of average number of negotiation rounds) of the negotiation processes
were evaluated. We adopt the relative measure of “negotiation rounds” to
assess the negotiation time involved in a negotiation process (and indirectly
measuring the computational/communication costs) so that it becomes easier
to compare our results with others which may be conducted in different com-
putational environments. Moreover, average weighted Euclidean distance [8]
was also used to measure how far away the solutions obtained by our proba-
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bilistic agents from the Pareto optimum:
AvgDist =
∑|PS|
j=1
∑|PA|
i=1 dist(
−→o i,−→o j)
|PA| × |PS| (8)
dist(−→o x,−→o y) =
√√√√√ |A|∑
i=1
wi(dxai − dyai)2 (9)
where PA ⊆ P is the set of agents reaching an agreement in an e-marketplace,
and PS is the set of Pareto optimal solutions. As each agent has its own
preference wi for an attribute ai, the average distance is computed among the
agents PA by Eq.(8). Since the Pareto optimum set PS may contain more
than one optimal solution, the mean distance between the agents’ solution and
every Pareto optimal solution is computed. The weight factor wi = U
A
p (ai) in
Eq.(9) is an agent’s valuation for a particular attribute ai ∈ A. An offer
vector −→o x contains an attribute value dxai along the ith dimension (issue) in a
negotiation space. If an attribute interval instead of a single value is specified
for an offer, the mid-point of an attribute interval is first computed.
6.3 Experiment One
Hypothesis One: The probabilistic negotiation agents empowered by data min-
ing mechanisms are more efficient than the Pareto optimal agents which are
not equipped with the knowledge discovery mechanisms.
The first experiment aimed at developing a basic test to see if the proposed ne-
gotiation knowledge mining method could improve the negotiation processes.
Two buyer agents and two seller agents were involved (i.e., |P | = 4) in this
experiment. There were six negotiation groups which are characterized by var-
ious levels of conflict among the buyers and the sellers. Each group contained
ten negotiation cases (i.e., totally 6× 10 = 60 simulated e-marketplaces). For
the first negotiation group, buyers and sellers had exactly the same utility
functions (i.e., no conflict). Two utility functions are the same if both the val-
uation of the attributes and the valuation of the corresponding attribute values
are the same. For each succeeding group, buyers and sellers were characterized
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by having common weighting from one (small conflict group) to five attributes
(highest conflict group) respectively [26]. For these negotiation groups, oppos-
ing valuations of the attribute values were created between the buying side
and the selling side. In this experiment, no negotiation deadline was imposed
in the e-marketplaces. The control group consisted of the Pareto optimal ne-
gotiation agents developed according to the negotiation mechanism described
in Section 4. These agents could found Pareto optimal solutions when time
constraint was not present. After running a simulated e-marketplace, the av-
erage joint-payoffs and the average negotiation time were recorded. Table 2
shows an example of the utility functions for a buyer agent p1 and a seller
agent p2 used in this experiment.
Agent Buyer: p1
UAp1
(price) = 0.3 UAp1
(qty) = 0.3 UAp1
(size) = 0.2 UAp1
(delivery) = 0.1 UAp1
(warranty) = 0.1
U
Dprice
p1
(1) = 0.9 U
Dqty
p1
(1) = 0.9 U
Dsize
p1
(1) = 0.9 U
Ddelivery
p1
(1) = 0.9 U
Dwarranty
p1
(1) = 0.9
U
Dprice
p1
(2) = 0.8 U
Dqty
p1
(2) = 0.8 U
Dsize
p1
(2) = 0.8 U
Ddelivery
p1
(2) = 0.8 U
Dwarranty
p1
(2) = 0.8
U
Dprice
p1
(3) = 0.6 U
Dqty
p1
(3) = 0.6 U
Dsize
p1
(3) = 0.6 U
Ddelivery
p1
(3) = 0.6 U
Dwarranty
p1
(3) = 0.6
U
Dprice
p1
(4) = 0.2 U
Dqty
p1
(4) = 0.2 U
Dsize
p1
(4) = 0.2 U
Ddelivery
p1
(4) = 0.2 U
Dwarranty
p1
(4) = 0.2
U
Dprice
p1
(5) = 0.1 U
Dqty
p1
(5) = 0.1 U
Dsize
p1
(5) = 0.1 U
Ddelivery
p1
(5) = 0.1 U
Dwarranty
p1
(5) = 0.1
Agent Seller: p2
UAp2
(price) = 0.3 UAp2
(qty) = 0.3 UAp2
(size) = 0.2 UAp2
(delivery) = 0.1 UAp2
(warranty) = 0.1
U
Dprice
p2
(1) = 0.1 U
Dqty
p2
(1) = 0.1 U
Dsize
p2
(1) = 0.1 U
Ddelivery
p2
(1) = 0.1 U
Dwarranty
p2
(1) = 0.1
U
Dprice
p2
(2) = 0.2 U
Dqty
p2
(2) = 0.2 U
Dsize
p2
(2) = 0.2 U
Ddelivery
p2
(2) = 0.2 U
Dwarranty
p2
(2) = 0.2
U
Dprice
p2
(3) = 0.5 U
Dqty
p2
(3) = 0.5 U
Dsize
p2
(3) = 0.5 U
Ddelivery
p2
(3) = 0.5 U
Dwarranty
p2
(3) = 0.5
U
Dprice
p2
(4) = 0.8 U
Dqty
p2
(4) = 0.8 U
Dsize
p2
(4) = 0.8 U
Ddelivery
p2
(4) = 0.8 U
Dwarranty
p2
(4) = 0.8
U
Dprice
p2
(5) = 0.9 U
Dqty
p2
(5) = 0.9 U
Dsize
p2
(5) = 0.9 U
Ddelivery
p2
(5) = 0.9 U
Dwarranty
p2
(5) = 0.9
Table 2
The Utility Functions of Two Agents
The experimental group comprised of the same number of non-adaptive (i.e.,
the priori probabilities about the opponents’ preferences were not updated)
probabilistic negotiation agents as defined in Section 5. The same set of ne-
gotiation cases attempted by the Pareto optimal agents were applied to the
probabilistic agents. The negotiation histories of the Pareto optimal agents
were made available to the probabilistic agents as the training set. As a re-
sult, each probabilistic agent had some knowledge about its opponents before
the negotiation process began. In particular, only the first 60% of the entries
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captured in a negotiation session were used to train the probabilistic agents.
We employed a heuristic wmin >= |E|MAX and wmax >= |session| × wmin to
derive various combinations of wmax and wmin, whereas |E|MAX is the number
of entries of the largest archived session, and |session| is the number of ses-
sions archived in the negotiation history file. Based on the empirical testing for
typical negotiation scenarios, we found that the parameters wmax = 20, 000,
wmin = 2, 000, α = 0.6 produced good performance and so they were adopted
in this experiment. After a negotiation process began, a probabilistic agent
could estimate the posteriori probability Pr(accept|o) for each of its opponent
based on the training data. In this experiment, the preference of each agent
remained static.
Pareto Optimal Probabilistic
Group Avg. Joint-Util. Avg. Time Avg. Joint-Util. Avg. Time Avg. Dist.
1 2.74 1.0 2.74 1.0 0.00
2 2.41 562.0 2.35 459.0 0.15
3 2.38 813.0 2.31 622.5 0.18
4 2.29 1036.0 2.23 804.0 0.17
5 2.15 1483.5 2.04 1110.0 0.22
6 1.87 1734.0 1.73 1352.0 0.26
Mean 2.31 938.25 2.23 724.75 0.16
Table 3
The Impact of Bayesian Learning on Negotiations
According to the experimental results depicted in Table 3, the Pareto optimal
agents achieved an overall average joint utility of 2.31 by using 938.25 negoti-
ation rounds on average. On the other hand, the probabilistic agents achieved
an overall average joint utility of 2.23 in 724.75 negotiation rounds on average.
There was a 2.31−2.23
2.31
×100 = 3.2% decrement of the overall average joint utility
when the probabilistic agents were engaged in the same negotiation situations
as the Pareto optimal agents. The overall average distance from the solutions
found by the probabilistic agents to the Pareto optimum is 0.16 which is con-
sidered a small distance. However, the improvement in terms of reduced aver-
age negotiation time of the probabilistic agents is 938.25−724.75
938.25
× 100 = 22.8%.
Except the first negotiation group, the probabilistic agents consistently con-
sumed less negotiation time than that of the Pareto optimal agents. For each
test case in the first negotiation group, both buyers and sellers had exactly
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the same utility function. Therefore, an agreement could always be found in
the first negotiation round. According to paired one tail t-test, the average ne-
gotiation time consumed by probabilistic agents is significantly less than that
of the Pareto optimal agents, t(5) = −3.48, p < .01. Therefore, we conclude
that the probabilistic negotiation agents empowered by knowledge discovery
mechanisms can identify negotiation solutions faster than the Pareto optimal
agents do. Hypothesis One is supported according to our experiment.
Fig. 4. The Impact of α on Agents’ Performance
The impact of the trade-off factor α on the performance of our probabilistic
negotiation agents was evaluated. In particular, we would like to observe how
the various levels of α affect the quality of the solutions (e.g., average distance
from the Pareto optimum) and the time required to search for those solutions.
Figure 4 plots the overall average distance between the solutions found by the
probabilistic agents and that produced by the Pareto optimal agents over the
six negotiation groups listed in Table 3. It should be noted that the overall
average distances plotted in Figure 4 was scaled up by a factor of one thousand.
It is shown that a lower rate of decrement of the overall average distance occurs
beyond α = 0.6, and at the same time a higher rate of increment of the overall
average negotiation time (e.g., a larger angle of the slop) occurs. Therefore,
we set the trade-off factor to α = 0.6 to strive for a better balance between
the quality of the negotiation solutions and the time required to identify those
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solutions.
Fig. 5. The Impact of Negotiation History on Agents’ Performance
In addition, we examined the impact of the availability of various amount
of negotiation history data (i.e., the training set) on the effectiveness of the
probabilistic negotiation agents. The negotiation histories were obtained by
repeatedly invoking the Pareto optimal agents to attempt the 60 negotia-
tion cases we developed before. Each negotiation history file contained certain
number of recorded sessions (i.e., negotiation processes) and each session con-
tained certain number of entries (i.e., offers and counter-offers). In particular,
we made the first x percentage of the negotiation entries in a session and the
first y percentage of negotiation sessions in a history file available to train the
probabilistic agents in each run. After the training process, the probabilistic
agents would start to negotiate as before. Figure 5 highlights the overall aver-
age joint payoff achieved by the probabilistic negotiation agents when various
number of entries and sessions are used to train them. It is shown that us-
ing more than 60% of the top entries and more than 2 negotiation sessions
to train the probabilistic agents cannot improve the maximal average joint
utility. In fact, employing a large number of sessions (e.g., 10 sessions) and
all the entries (100%) of a negotiation session to train a probabilistic agent
may even lead to slightly degraded performance because the final offers do not
represent the actual preference of the opponent due to the concession making
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process. According to our empirical testing, it only took 6.1 seconds to train
an agent (i.e., computing all the priori probabilities) with a negotiation history
file containing 10 sessions and each session containing 500 entries on average.
This shows a positive sign for the computational efficiency of our negotiation
knowledge discovery method.
As a summary, this experiment confirms that the probabilistic negotiation
agents empowered by the knowledge discovery mechanism can make use of
the knowledge about their opponents to find agreements faster. With better
knowledge about their opponents, the probabilistic negotiation agents can
by-pass some of non-fruitful offers (e.g., chance of acceptance is low) from
the set of feasible offers. Even though the probabilistic agents are not fully
self-interested, they can achieve near optimal joint payoffs. This represents
a win-win negotiation strategy. Such a strategy is desirable for negotiations
in B2B e-commerce because it helps maintain long-term relationships among
business partners.
6.4 Experiment Two
Hypothesis Two: Under time pressure, the probabilistic negotiation agents out-
perform the Pareto optimal agents in terms of negotiation effectiveness.
The second experiment tries to evaluate the effectiveness of our probabilis-
tic agents under realistic negotiation condition such as the presence of time
pressure. In addition, we would like to test the agents’ time adjustment mecha-
nisms defined according to Eq.(5). The same set of negotiation cases employed
in experiment one was re-used with a negotiation deadline of 500 rounds. This
experiment was still based on a control group vs. experimental group design.
The first simulation run involved the Pareto optimal agents, and then the
non-adaptive probabilistic agents participated in the second simulation run.
The third simulation run involved the non-adaptive probabilistic agents with
the time adjustment mechanisms Eq.(5) activated. The concession attitude
ep = 0.4 was set for all the time sensitive probabilistic agents. If an agent
could not find a deal before the negotiation deadline, its payoff would be zero.
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Group Pareto Optimal Probabilistic Eq.(1) Probabilistic Eq.(5)
1 2.74 2.74 2.74
2 1.93 2.16 2.31
3 1.66 1.81 2.02
4 1.15 1.34 1.95
5 0.86 1.05 1.88
6 0.19 0.36 1.63
Mean 1.42 1.58 2.09
Table 4
Agent Performance Under Time Pressure
The average joint-payoffs obtained by different types of agents from six ne-
gotiation groups are tabulated in Table 4. The overall average joint payoffs
achieved by the Pareto optimal agents, the probabilistic agents, and the time
sensitive probabilistic agents are 1.41, 1.58, and 2.09 respectively. Except the
first negotiation group where agents could always find the best agreements
in the first negotiation round, the probabilistic agents consistently performed
better than the Pareto optimal agents, and the time sensitive probabilistic
agents also performed better than their non time sensitive counterparts. Ac-
cording to paired one tail t-test, the average joint payoffs achieved by the
probabilistic agents which are not time sensitive is significantly higher than
that of the Pareto optimal agents, t(5) = 4.72, p < .01. Therefore, we can
conclude that our proposed probabilistic agents are more effective than the
Pareto optimal agents under time pressure. Hypothesis Two is supported ac-
cording to our experiment. The reason for such a difference is that the Pareto
optimal agents could not be able to find solutions before the deadline in many
cases where negotiation conflicts existed. On the other hand, the probabilistic
agents were able to carry out the search faster (e.g., by ignoring some less
promising deals). As a result, they were able to seal some deals even though
a tough deadline was imposed.
There was a significant performance boost of the probabilistic agents who were
empowered by the time adjustment mechanism because these agents were sen-
sitive to the negotiation deadlines. When the deadline was approaching, these
agents tended to propose offers which were more likely to be accepted by their
opponents (e.g., the α value drop to a very low value). As a consequence, the
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Fig. 6. Comparative Concession Behavior Among Three Types of Agents
time sensitive probabilistic agents could find agreements for all the negotia-
tion cases in this experiment. Figure 6 shows the difference of the concession
making processes conducted by a Pareto optimal agent (PO), a probabilistic
agent (PR), and a time sensitive probabilistic agent (PRT) respectively. The
Y axis in Figure 6 represents the potential utility value brought to an agent if
the corresponding offer is really accepted by the opponent. The comparison is
based on one of the negotiation cases from negotiation group 4, and the po-
tential payoffs of the offers are computed from the perspective of the sellers.
It is not difficult to find that the concession making behavior of the time sen-
sitive probabilistic agent is different from the other two agents. For instance,
there was a bigger drop of the utility values of the agent’s offers when the
deadline was approaching. In this case, the time sensitive probabilistic agent
found an agreement at the 486th negotiation round, whereas the other two
agents could not find solution before the deadline of the 500th negotiation
rounds. According to paired one tail t-test, the average payoffs of the proba-
bilistic agents is significantly less than that of the time sensitive probabilistic
agents, t(5) = −2.59, p = .02. As can be seen, the proposed time adjustment
mechanism for probabilistic agents is effective since it can improve negotiation
outcomes in general.
We further tested the concession attitude of the time sensitive probabilistic
negotiation agents by varying the parameter value ep = 0.1 (extreme Boulware
agents) and ep = 10 (Conceder agents) while keeping the other experimental
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conditions unchanged. For the extreme Boulware agents, the overall average
joint payoff achieved is 2.06. For the Conceder agents, the overall average joint
payoff achieved is 1.95. The extreme Boulware agents actually failed to reach
an agreement in one case with high conflict and so their performance was not
as good as the little Boulware agents. On the other hand, the conceder agents
conceded too quickly even for the neutral negotiation situations, and therefore
their performance was not as good as the little Boulware agents either.
6.5 Experiment Three
Hypothesis Three: Under dynamic negotiation environment (e.g., the presence
of preferential changes of the negotiators), the adaptive probabilistic negotia-
tion agents can achieve near Pareto optimal negotiation results.
Under realistic negotiation situations, the preferences of negotiation agents
may change over time. This experiment tries to test if the adaptive proba-
bilistic negotiation agents (i.e., their priori probabilities were updated after
every negotiation round) can achieve good negotiation outcomes given the
preferential changes of themselves and their opponents. At the beginning of
the simulations, we employed the same set of negotiation cases used in exper-
iment one. However, the utility functions of the agents would be modified n
times after the negotiation processes started. As a result, the utility functions
of these agents may not be the same as that examined in experiment one when
the negotiation processes completed. The final outcomes in terms of average
joint payoffs and the average distances from the Pareto optimum would be
recorded. The final negotiation outcomes were computed according to the last
modified utility functions of the agents. For instance, after 100 rounds of nego-
tiations, the valuation values of m attributes pertaining to each agent would
be randomly selected and modified. After another 100 rounds of negotiations,
the agents’ valuation functions would be changed again (i.e., n = 2). To en-
sure the required number of preferential changes could be injected into each
agent, these agents were forced not to accept a deal until the last change was
injected. No negotiation deadline was imposed in this experiment.
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Pareto Evolutionary Probabilistic
Optimum Agents Agents
Group Avg. Joint Avg. Joint Avg. Dist. Avg. Joint Avg. Dist.
Utility Utility Utility
1 2.74 2.74 0.00 2.74 0.00
2 2.45 2.41 0.15 2.42 0.14
3 2.26 2.16 0.21 2.14 0.22
4 2.18 2.12 0.18 2.11 0.19
5 2.07 1.96 0.23 1.96 0.23
6 1.92 1.79 0.25 1.78 0.25
Table 5
Performance of Probabilistic Negotiation Agents
To evaluate the adaptiveness of the probabilistic agents, we invoked the adap-
tive evolutionary negotiation agents [20] under the same conditions (e.g., the
same utility function and the same preferential changes of the agents). The
evolutionary agents were developed based on a genetic algorithm (a heuris-
tic search approach) and they were not equipped with a knowledge discovery
mechanism. The negotiation agents discussed in this paper were empowered
by a knowledge discovery mechanism underpinned by Bayesian learning. The
comparison between the performance of the evolutionary agents and that of
the adaptive probabilistic agents is tabulated in Table 5. For this experiment,
the parameters n = 2 and m = 2 were used, whereas n and m stand for the
frequency of changes and the number of attributes modified respectively. It
should be noted that the first negotiation group was a reference group where
no preferential changes was injected to the agents. As the preferences of the
buyers and the sellers were the same for this negotiation group, an agreement
was always reached in the first negotiation round in each case. By ignoring
the reference group (negotiation group 1), the overall average distance of the
solutions found by the adaptive probabilistic agents from the Pareto optimum
is 0.14+0.22+0.19+0.23+0.25
5
= 0.21, which is close to that achieved by the non-
adaptive probabilistic agents in experiment one. This demonstrates that the
average performance of our adaptive probabilistic agents can be maintained
even though they operate under a more challenging dynamic negotiation en-
vironment. By excluding group one, the overall average joint payoff of the
adaptive probabilistic agents is only 4.3% less than the Pareto optimum.
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Based on our simulations, the difference between the average joint payoff of the
evolutionary agents and that of the adaptive probabilistic agents is marginal
(by paired one tail t-test, t(5) = 1.17, p = .15). On the other hand, significant
difference of the average weighted Euclidean distances between the evolution-
ary agents and the probabilistic agents was not found (by paired one tail t-test,
t(5) = -0.54, p = .31). Therefore, we conclude that the adaptive probabilistic
agents are able to adapt to the dynamic negotiation environment, and these
agents can produce negotiation outcomes very close to the Pareto optimum
(e.g., 4.3% less than the optimum). The performance of the adaptive prob-
abilistic agents is comparable to that achieved by the adaptive evolutionary
agents whose effectiveness was tested in a previous study [20]. In general,
Hypothesis Three is supported according to our study.
Fig. 7. The Impact of Changes on Average Distance from Pareto Optimum
Figure 7 plots the overall average distances from the Pareto optimum given
the various values of n and m. The overall average distances shown in Figure 7
excluded the negotiation group one since no preferential change was injected
to the agents in this group. It is not difficult to observe that the agents can
adapt to the preferential changes presented in the negotiation environment.
As a result, the overall average distances from the Pareto optimum do not
vary much given more frequent changes and greater extent of changes. How-
ever, if the changes occurred more frequently, the negotiation efficiency will be
affected. Figure 8 shows that more frequent preferential changes of the agents
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Fig. 8. The Impact of Changes on Average Negotiation Time
will generally increase the overall average negotiation time. The reason is that
the agents need to take time to learn the opponents’ new preferences and
adapt to these preferences. Nevertheless, the probabilistic negotiation agents
seem robust enough in responding to the frequent changes because the negoti-
ation time is only increased linearly with respect to the number of preferential
changes as shown in Figure 8.
7 Conclusions and Future Work
Intelligent software agents are promising for supporting business negotiations
in e-marketplaces. Since real-world negotiation spaces are complex and dy-
namic, it is desirable to empower negotiation agents with effective knowledge
discovery mechanisms so that these agents can automatically uncover essen-
tial negotiation knowledge to improve negotiation outcomes. A novel knowl-
edge discovery method and the corresponding probabilistic negotiation deci-
sion making mechanism are developed for adaptive negotiation agents. These
agents can continuously learn the preferences of their opponents based on
the negotiation dialogs recorded in history files. Our preliminary experiments
show that the probabilistic negotiation agents empowered by knowledge dis-
covery mechanisms can make a better balance between maximizing self-payoff
and improving offer acceptability, and therefore they are more effective and
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efficient than the Pareto optimal agents under realistic negotiation conditions.
Our research opens the door to the development of intelligent software tools
to enhance the autonomy and effectiveness of e-marketplaces. Future work
involves studying the interaction effect between the optimistic agents and the
pessimistic agents. Moreover, Bayesian belief network will be explored to rep-
resent the dependency among the issues for complex negotiation spaces.
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